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Humanism and Disegno:  
Neoplatonism at the Accademia di San Luca in Rome 
John Hendrix, Rhode Island School of Design 
 
 
I would like to explore the role that Neoplatonism played in the development of the con-
cept of disegno at the Accademia di San Luca in Rome, and its influence on subsequent 
architecture, for the purpose of illustrating the importance of Renaissance Humanism in 
the culture of Baroque Rome. 
      In his treatise, L’Idea de’ pittori, scultori ed architteti, in 1607, Federico Zuccari, the 
director of the Academy, described disegno interno as a Platonic Idea in the mind of the 
artist, and a forma spirituale which mediates between archê and eidos, between universal 
and particular. Disegno interno is a scintilla della divinità, a spark of the fire of the Di-
vine intellect, which is manifest in Nous, or Intellectual Principle, from Plotinus, that part 
of Mind which participates in the Divine. Form enters matter through design, and intel-
lect is the instument which molds form. For Zuccari, disegno is a segno di dio in noi, or 
sign of God in us, as manifest in intellectus speculativus, or internal contemplation. Uni-
versal design becomes particular design as universals are transformed into particulars, 
through types, similitudes and metaphors. The spark in Nous creates dream images, phan-
tasms, and imaginations. 
      Plato, in the Republic, distinguished between imitative representation and cognitive 
process. The artist invests form with concept. Aristotle, in the Metaphysics, described the 
form of the work of art as pre-existing in the mind of the artist. Plotinus, in the Enneads, 
defined form as that which enters matter through intellect. The artist reproduces the prin-
ciples of nature rather than its appearance. Form or eidos, in both art and nature, is pro-
duced by the ordering principles of Mind, or Nous. Marsilio Ficino, in Sopra lo amore, or 
Commentary on the Symposium of Plato, in 1444, distinguished between Bellezza, sensi-
ble beauty, and the Bello, disegno interno, of which Bellezza is a product. Res extensa, 
external form, is a realization of res cogitans, ideas. In Ficino’s Theologia Platonica, de-
sign is seen as a mirror to the intellect, reasoned through ‘metaphor and similitude’. This 
concept is developed in the transcripts of the Accademia di San Luca in Rome, Origine et 
Progresso dell’Academia del Disegno, in 1604, written by Romano Alberti. The distinc-
tion between Bello and Bellezza is developed by Pietro da Cortona in his treatise, Trattato 
della Pittura e Scultura, in 1652, written with Domenico Ottonelli, using the pseudonyms 
Britio Prenetteri and Odomenigico Lelonotti.  
      Pietro da Cortona played an active role in the Academy, as did Carlo Maderno, and 
the influence of the concept of disegno can be seen in particular in the architecture of 
Pietro and Francesco Borromini, in works such as Santi Luca e Martina and San Carlo 
alle Quattro Fontane, which can be seen as visual and structural representations of the in-
tellect of the artist and the principles of nature. This can be seen in mathematical, geo-
metrical, and metaphorical models of the structure of the cosmos as used by both 
architects. Precedents for the role of ‘metaphor and similitude’ in architectural design can 
be seen in works such as Michelangelo’s Porta Pia and Giulio Romano’s Palazzo del Tè 
in the sixteenth century.         




Zuccari expressed in L’Idea de’ pittori, scultori ed architetti, in the Neoplatonic tradition, 
that the form of the work of art exists first in the mind of the artist, considering design 
universally as the fabrication of every intellectual idea1. Disegno interno is ‘a concept 
formed in our mind, that enables us explicitly and clearly to recognize anything, whatever 
it may be, and to operate practically in conformance with the thing intended’2. The Idea is 
a forma spirituale which is both ‘divised and used by the intellect to apprehend all natural 
things clearly and distinctly’3, and the expression of such apprehension in artistic materi-
als; here the Idea is differentiated from the theological Idea as it is applied to artistic pro-
duction, or artistic representation, which is called disegno esterno, or external design. 
Following Plato, disegno esterno is the imitation of an idol, and it is also a metaphor for 
disegno interno, the inner ordering principle and Neoplatonic light of the intellect4.  
      Plato conceived of the idea as being ‘in the world of shapes and figures something 
perfect and sublime, to which imagined form those objects not accessible to sensory per-
ception can be related by way of imitation’5, in the words of Cicero in the Orator. For 
Plato the Idea, the form of a thing, exists ‘eternally, being contained in our reason and our 
intellect: all else is born and dies, remains in a state of flux’. As such Plato distinguished 
between imitative representation6, or the ability to render only the sensory appearances of 
the material world, and form which is invested with the concept of cognitive truth in the 
attainment of a universal and eternal form corresponding to the idea. Such a distinction 
would mean a distinction and separation, and also identification, between the aesthetic 
and the theoretical, between sensory experience and rational cognition.  
      Form and concept, image and idea should be combined in the work of art. The work 
of art is defined as being invested with scientific and mathematical principles which it 
can reveal, as in architecture and music, but can only exist in the realm of images, and not 
ideas, and can thus inhibit as much as aid the knowledge of the Idea—the unrepresentable 
should not be represented, though form should suggest concept. As the reception of mate-
rial objects by sensory perception is conceived as a cognitive function, so form should be 
invested with cognitive process, but can only be done so by that process. Aristotle distin-
guishes between form and matter, appearance and idea as well, but he sees them as inter-
acting, in that form enters into matter. In Book VII of Metaphysics, ‘The thing in the 
sense of form or substance we do not make, but the so-called compound whole we make; 
and in everything that is made matter is present and one part of it is matter and the other 
form’7.  
      Art for Aristotle is a form of the power of thought, and the form of the material prod-
uct contains the essence, or is the essence, of the form in the idea of the maker. As form 
and matter interact, so thought and substance interact in form. The form of a work of art 
exists in the mind of the artist before being translated into matter, and, as for Plato, pure 
form is indivisible in contrast to its material existence as part of matter, which is divisible 
and temporal. In the Metaphysics, ‘That which is a union of form and matter can dissolve 
into material parts; but that which is not bound up with matter, cannot dissolve’8. Matter 
is that which springs from the Prime Unity. It is the single substance to which all bodies 
can be reduced.  
      For Aristotle, the Idea is the combination of matter and form. Cognition, as a univer-
sal act, an act of the Universal Intelligence of which human intelligence is a part, is trans-
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formed into the form of the material object or work of art. The work of art is invested 
with the Universal Intelligence, unified in the absolute, but dissolved into material parts 
through individual cognitive acts, then combined in the compound whole. The cognitive 
acts, the thoughts, are then identified with the material parts. From the Metaphysics, ‘The 
mind thinks of itself, when it takes on the nature of an object of thought. It becomes an 
object of thought through its perceiving and thinking, and then thought and object of 
thought are the same’9. Matter is integrated with form, and thought is conflated with the 
object of thought in its actualizing potential as a product of the diversification of the ab-
solute, through the realization of form, as in art. Such a concept would lead to the devel-
opment of disegno and the Idea in sixteenth-century Italy, where art is seen as the 
manifestation of conceptualization itself through the Idea, which can be read in seven-
teenth-century Roman Baroque architecture. As Zuccari explains, in L’Idea de’ Pittori, 
Scultori e Architetti, ‘Design is formed form, and imaged in the soul, and in the intellect; 
therefore our soul and intellect should be as instruments; the senses bring objects, and 
sensible forms from the intellective part of the soul, and the intellect takes the forms from 
the forms, that is Design is formed from the same types, and so learns, intends, and 
knows...’10. 
        For Aristotle, the interaction between form and matter and between appearance and 
idea is paralleled by the interaction between the general concept (relating to Universal In-
telligence) and the particular idea, relating to the cognitive act. From the Metaphysics, the 
individual man, for example, is ‘this particular form in this particular flesh and blood’11. 
The appearance in art does not imitate the Idea—instead form enters into matter. In that 
the forms of art can exist in the mind of the artist beforehand, they are different from the 
forms of nature, but they are like the forms of nature in the interaction of form and matter. 
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle illustrates the preexistence of form in the mind with the 
conception of the house by the architect and the statue by the sculptor, though the house 
and statue can only preexist as form through the Idea, and not as matter. 
 
The Neoplatonic Idea: Plotinus, Aquinas and Ficino 
 
Plotinus, who taught philosophy in Rome from 245 to 270, separated form from matter as 
well. He explains, in ‘On the Intellectual Beauty’, the Eighth Tractate of The Six Enneads, 
‘The form is not in the material; it is in the designer before ever it enters the stone; and 
the artificer holds it not by his equipment of eyes and hands but by his participation in his 
art’12, that is, in the Idea, the conceptualization of the form. As for Plato, form is trans-
ferred from the Universal Intellect into matter, but in a contaminated state, disseminated 
and no longer ideal. Beauty in art is only a derivation of beauty in the Idea or Intellect.     
        The form in the material cannot be compared to the form in the Idea. Art, in the con-
ceptualization of the Universal Intellect through which the form is given, must contain 
within it an idea of absolute form in the material, an internal idea which must be commu-
nicated although its material existence, its external form, falls short. Plotinus explains in 
The Enneads, that the Idea or Reason Principle must contain a higher degree of beauty 
and purity than anything produced as art, as an external object. The order of the universe 
may be revealed through particular form, as the macrocosm is revealed through the mi-
crocosm, through the Idea, through conceptualization in form. For Plotinus, this occurs 
through the intellect or principle which is found in nature. ‘Artists do not simply repro-
 4 
duce the visible, but they go back to the principles in which nature itself had found its 
origin’13. The generation of the principles of the origin of nature constitute the Idea. The 
architecture of Borromini, as at San Carlo alle Quattro Fontane, can be seen as a visual 
and structural representation of the principles of nature as given by Neoplatonic philoso-
phy. The architecture of Leon Battista Alberti, as at Santa Maria Novella, seeks as well to 
reproduce the principles of nature in mathematical and geometric abstractions.  
        Then the task for Plotinus is to discover what in the principles of nature can be trans-
ferred as form in the Idea. The matter of nature alone is ugliness without an intellect, an 
organizing principle, or a superimposed Idea relating the order of nature, to the human 
intellect. Using the metaphor of architecture to apply the principles of nature to art, as 
constructed from natural material, Plotinus asks, ‘How can the architect adjust the exter-
nally apparent house to the internal eidos of the house and insist that it is beautiful? Only 
for this reason, that the external house, if the stones are imagined away, is the internal ei-
dos, divided of course with regard to the mass of matter, but indivisible in essence, even 
though appearing in multiple form’14. The work of art is the Idea, the intellection of the 
internal principles of nature. Structures belonging to appearances are imitations of the 
Idea, as in architecture, rather than form, as form is divisible in matter but indivisible in 
the Idea. The Idea, that which is beyond sensory images in the ordering of the universe, is 
continually present but inaccessible, as it is concealed in the architecture of Borromini, in 
mathematical and geometrical structures underlying the formal arrangements. 
        For Plotinus the ordering principles of the Universal Intellect are shared by the Hu-
man Intellect in the creative Nous, an actualized form of the absolute, defined as an ab-
stract ordering principle in the Mind and a controlling and organizing principle of matter, 
thus a model of reality expressed in concrete philosophical, spatial and architectural 
terms. The Nous of the human intellect is capable of formulating the Idea within itself, 
while for Plato the Idea only existed outside the human intellect. Through Nous, the in-
corporeal and intangible thoughts of the Idea are disseminated into the spatial realm of 
form and matter. In that the ordering principles are shared by the human and universal in-
tellect, the idea of beauty is inaccessible to both sensory appearance and the organizing 
principle itself: ‘The Nature, then, which creates things so lovely must be itself of a far 
earlier beauty; we, undisciplined in discernment of the inward, knowing nothing of it, run 
after the outer, never understanding that it is the inner which stirs us; we are in the case of 
one who sees his own reflection but not realizing whence it comes goes in pursuit of 
it…’15. 
        The idea of beauty lies beyond the apparent structure of reality, and is given as an 
archetype, as in Nous. The archetype of the beauty found in material forms exists in the 
Nature Principle. The archetype is given by light and primal beauty and is the creative 
source of the first Reason Principle. The question, then, is how the Intellectual Principle 
is represented in an image or appearance, and the answer is by non-representation, by di-
vision and dissemination. The Idea gives shape or form to matter, and thus beauty, 
through Nous. In the section on Beauty, the Sixth Tractate of the Enneads, Ideal Form is 
defined as unity and harmony instilled into shape. 
        Thomas Aquinas, who lectured in Rome from 1265 to 1267, and began the Summa 
Theologica at Santa Sabina on the Aventine, formulated, in the tradition of Plato, Aris-
totle and Plotinus, a conception of the Idea, correlating idea with form, beginning with 
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the separation of form and matter, and the idea of form as principle in the Universal Intel-
lect. As he explains in Summa Theologica, 
 
the Greek word Idea is in Latin Forma. Hence by ideas are understood the 
forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form 
of anything, existing apart from the thing itself, can be for one of two ends; 
either to be the exemplar of that of which it is called the form, or to be the 
principle of the knowledge of that thing, according as the forms of know-
able things are said to be in him who knows them16. 
      
        Form is given by the inner principle, the human intellect as microcosm of the Uni-
versal Intellect. Works of art are differentiated from works of nature in that the form of 
the man-made object preexists in the intellect, though in both nature and the man-made 
object, the likeness of the form exists in the actuating principle, the creative Nous or the 
inner principle, as in the structure of the house, from Plotinus and Aristotle, the preexis-
tent Idea in the Nous of the architect. In all things not generated by chance, the form must 
be the end of any generation whatsoever. An agent of generation does not act for the sake 
of the form, but the likeness of the form is in the agent. In some agents the form of the 
thing preexists according to its natural being. In other agents the form of the thing preex-
ists according to intelligible being. Thus the likeness of a house preexists in the mind of 
the architect.  
        For Marsilio Ficino and the Florentine Platonic Academy, the Idea entails conceptu-
alization in the human intellect, and is no longer a metaphysical substance existing out-
side the world of sensory appearances or the human intellect. Art is the primary 
manifestation of the Idea, despite the Platonic restrictions of form as appearance and imi-
tation. Using the example of the architect, Ficino conceives of the process of abstraction 
in artistic production. He explains in Sopra lo amore,  
 
From the beginning the Architect conceives in his spirit the reason and ap-
proximately the Idea of the edifice; he then makes the house (according to 
his ability) in the way in which he has decided in his mind. Who will deny 
that the house is a body, and that it is very similar to the incorporeal Idea 
of the artisan, in whose image it has been made? It must certainly be 
judged for a certain incorporeal order rather than for its matter17.  
 
        The reconstruction of the image of the house or body in the imagination is given by 
the inner ordering principle of the sensory images. The order or form is incorporeal, in 
abstracted matter, as opposed to the matter. The order, emanating from the Universal In-
tellect, is preserved between the corporeal and incorporeal, and the order or form can ex-
ist without body or matter, as it is prior to it. Along with the abstraction of form and inner 
sensory images comes the Neoplatonic emphasis on interior illumination in the processes 
of imitation, as in the ordering of the rational principles of nature in Alberti’s concinnitas 
and the establishment of canons of beauty or Bellezza. Unlike Plotinus, form is a product 
of the human intellect while matter is a product of the exterior world, and res cogitans, or 
things thought, are separate in their generation from res extensa, or things external, 
though connected by the inner ordering principle.  
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         Bellezza, or sensible beauty, and the realization of the Bello, the idea of the beauti-
ful, in artistic representation, are manifestations of the metaphysical existence of form as 
well in Neoplatonic thought, given a priori in the ordering principle of the intellectual vi-
sion of form, as opposed to matter, and as opposed to generation and synthesis in the phe-
nomenological congregation of matter. In the metaphysic of the Bello, aesthetic value, 
representative of moral value, is transferred in the ordering principle, creating interior il-
lumination and the capacity to transfer the Bello to works of art. Bello is extracted from 
convinto, or conviction, but convinto is not associated with the generation of forms by Fi-
cino, although it is by Gian Paolo Lomazzo in the Trattato dell’arte della pittura, pub-
lished in 158418. Lomazzo combines the metaphysical idea of the Bello with the process 
of the artistic conception in Aristotelian terms; the metaphysic of interior illumination is 
combined with the interaction of matter and form in universal cognition and the making 
of things. 
 
Disegno Interno at the Accademia di San Luca 
 
Disegno interno exists a priori of artistic execution and is combined with Christian theol-
ogy by Zuccari in being the manifestation of the Universal Intellect, or a scintilla della 
divinita. The Idea is implanted by God in angels without sensory perception, and then it 
is transferred to human intelligence, as the aspect of Universal Intelligence in human in-
telligence. Works of art are meant to be thought as works of nature in resemblance and 
correspondence, in embodying the same internal principles, as in Leon Battista Alberti’s 
concinnitas. Following Plotinus, the forms produced or replicated from an incorruptible 
substance are varied, infinite, fragmented, corrupted and disseminated, as in Borromini’s 
architecture, in comparison to the pure and unified forms of the absolute, as in the lantern 
of San Carlo, in the pure light from the oculus and the resolution of architectural forms. 
Baroque forms contrast the intertwined and variegated corporeal forms of the terrestrial 
realm in Neoplatonic hierarchies to the pure forms of the absolute, representing a passage 
through the tortured labyrinth of reality. For Zuccari, forms of design can only be the re-
sult of accident: 
 
But in forming this internal Design man is very different from God: God 
has one single Design, most perfect in substance, containing all things, 
which is not different from Him, because all that which is in God is God; 
man, however, forms within himself various designs corresponding to the 
different things he conceives. Therefore his design is an accident, and 
moreover it has a lower origin, namely in the senses19. 
      
        Human designs are formed by a process which Zuccari compares to a spark, as in 
the scintilla della divinita, the spark being the first concept created from the intellective 
virtue, or Idea, the first manifestation, in Aristotelian terms, of the Idea in the sensory 
imagination, being, as in an accident, indeterminate and confused. The spark is the trans-
formation of the Idea, as matter and form, into cognition, retaining both matter and form, 
following Aristotle.      
        The light from the spark is interior illumination, which lights the senses and the in-
tellect, and is disseminated in variegated material, as in San Carlo, and sculptural ensem-
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bles such as Bernini’s Ecstasy of St. Theresa. Order is manifest in material form, being 
transferred through the ordering principle of the Idea. In L’Idea de’Pittori, Scultori e Ar-
chitetti: 
 
As to form fire the stick strikes the stone, from the stone sparks escape, the 
sparks light the tinder, then the wick is carried from the tinder to light the 
lamp; so the intellective virtue strikes the stone of concepts in the human 
mind, and the first concept, a spark ascending the tinder from the imagina-
tion, and moves phantasms, and ideal imaginations—this first concept is 
indeterminate and confused, born in the faculty of the soul, or the agent of 
the intellect possible and understood20.  
      
        Disegno interno is a sign of the possibility but imperfection of human knowledge. 
Nature achieves order through an intellective principle, formulated through the projection 
of human logic and reason onto the mute forms of nature. Art imitates nature in so far as 
it enacts human reason, of which the forms of nature are representative: 
 
And if we wish to know why Nature can be imitated, it is because Nature 
is guided toward its own goal and toward its own procedures by an intel-
lective principle. Therefore her work is the work of unerring intelligence, 
as the philosophers say; for she reaches her goal by orderly and infallible 
means. And since art, chiefly with the aid of the above-mentioned design, 
observes precisely the same in its procedure, therefore Nature can be imi-
tated by art, and art is able to imitate Nature21. 
      
        Because the forms of nature are combinations of form and matter, art is capable of 
forming itself from the Idea or intellect. Through the agent of the mind of the artist, artis-
tic forms arise as natural forms, forms being transformed into matter, accidental and dis-
cernible, revealing in the indeterminateness and confusion of sensory experience the clear 
order of the intellective principle. The multiple and variable forms of the material world 
emanate from the unity of the absolute as the multiple forms of Baroque architecture in 
the worship space of the church emanate from the unified and resolved source of light in 
the lantern. Multiplicity and variability are the result of the limitations of the human intel-
lect. Following Aristotle, disegno interno is a process of actualization, and intellect is an 
operating instrument. Disegno involves the phantasm, formed concept and object of sen-
sation, a mental representation of a real object, a product of the imagination, a manifesta-
tion and reflection of form according to the intellective principle. ‘Design is form, 
concept, idea, and light of the intellect, and in its potential of intention and understanding, 
its first intellections…are not without phantasms; phantasms, say the philosophers, are 
sensible things, ideally formed concepts’22. Disegno also entails dreams, which serve to 
form, in the internal sense of the imagination, prototypes for representations of form in 
images, through cognition and judgment. ‘Imagination is formed by common sense in 
cognition, judgment, and the division of types, composed together as we experiment in 
dreams, having seen [objects of perception] represented in dreams’23.   
        For Zuccari, ‘whenever our intellect forms within itself some Universal Design, at 
the same time the two internal senses [cognition and imagination] form together their 
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own particular design’24. The disegno esterno of sensory experience is the particular cor-
relation to the universal disegno interno of abstraction and intellection in the Idea, the 
particularity in matter as defined temporally of universal form. The formation of particu-
lars in disegno esterno, and the identification of physical types, as in dreams, is a scien-
tific process: ‘Our intellect has in this way begun to intend something, and from that 
[process] science is acquired, and after being placed in it some type is acquired, and sci-
ence itself, also forms in itself various representative designs of this particular first 
known through the senses’25. Zuccari explains that the intellect first knows the nature of 
material things given by the internal principle, then it knows the types in which the nature 
is reflected, then it knows the singular forms caused by the types. The forms are known 
by the two internal concepts, sensed and unsensed, particular and universal, formed from 
imagination and cognition26, and become a particular design representing the singulars of 
the particular nature. 
        Design is the means by which the Idea in the intellect becomes the external form of 
the artistic production. Design is ‘both intellective and practical, corresponding to two in-
tellects in us, the speculative one for universal purposes, and the practical one for the 
purposes of our operations’27, as described in the transcripts of Romano Alberti. Both 
types of design are necessary, ‘as one is objective and has known limits in practical and 
particular things and the other represents things which are universally understood in the 
intellect. Thus there is an intellective design and a practical design’28. Design as a whole 
is the ‘expression and declaration of a concept, which is first in the mind’29. Disegno in-
terno fabricates the Idea, while disegno esterno fabricates the exterior visual experience. 
Disegno esterno is ‘defined in visual form. It is the form of all exemplary forms of all 
things which we can imagine and form’30.  
        External design ‘is a form of science, a faculty for determining the proportions of 
quantity in visible things31, a faculty assigned by Marsilio Ficino to the mechanism of vi-
sion in Theologia Platonica. But external design is also ‘a definition of our intelligence, 
reflecting the intellect in a clear mirror, making visible the things represented in the intel-
lect, through intelligible forms, reasoned in metaphor and similitude32. Artistic forms 
come about through the process of design in the use of literary tropes from Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, including metaphor and similitude. Meaning in the visual arts is given by lan-
guage, as visual forms are the manifestation of ideas. 
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 Zuccari, L’Idea, p. 25: ‘Pero dico, che si come per formare il fuoco il focile batte la 
pietra, dalle Pietra n’escon faville, le faville accendon l’esca; poi appressandosi all’esca i 
sosarelli s’accende la lucerna; Cosi la virtu intelletiva batte la pietra de i concetti nella 
mente humana; e il primo concetto, che svavilla accende l’esca dell’imaginatione, e move 
i fantasmi, e imaginationi ideali, il qual primo concetto è indeterminato, e confuso, ne 
dalla facolta dell’anima, o intelletto agente possibile e inteso’.  
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21
 Ibid., p. 21: ‘La ragione poi, perche l’arte imiti la Natura è; perche il Disegno interno 
artificiale, e l’arte istessa si muovono ad operare nella spedutione delle cose artificiali al 
modo, che opera a Natura istessa. E se vogliamo anco sapere perche la Natura sia imitabi-
le, e perche la Natura è ordinata da un principio intelletivo al suo proprio fine, e alle sue 
operationi; onde l’opera sua è opera dell’intelligenza non errante, come dicono i Filosofi’. 
22
 Ibid., p. 37: ‘Dunque il Disegno è forma, è concetto, è Idea, è luce all’intelletto, e alle 
potenze sue all’intendere, e al capire, e le prime intellettioni non sono fantasmati, ma non 
sono senza fantasmati; perioche i fantasmati, come il Filosofo vuole, sono cose sensibil, 
concetti formati Ideali’. 
23
 Ibid., p. 26: ‘Il secondo senso interno si chiama fantasia, è formate dal senso commune 
nella cognitione, giuditio, e coparatione di quelle specie, riceve in se stesso, e in oltre 
queste insieme compone, come noi esperimentiamo ne i sogni, ch’ havendo veduto’. 
24
 Ibid., p. 31: ‘che mai l’intelletto nostro forma entro di se qualche Disegno universale, 
se anco prima, o insieme questi due sensi interni non formano i proprii Disegni particola-
ri’. 
25
 Ibid., p. 32: ‘L’intelletto nostro ha in questo modo cominciato ad intendere qualche co-
sa, e di lei acquistata la scienza, o pure doppo posto in esso qualche specie acquistare, e la 
scienza istessa, forma anco in se stesso varii Disegni rappresentanti quel particolare cono-
sciuto per il senso’. 
26
 Ibid.: ‘In prima egli dirittamente conosce solo la natura commune delle cose, e poi in-
dirrittamente, e quasi reflettendosi sopra di se medesimo, considerando, e la specie, con la 
quale primo conobbe, e l’operatione con la quale conobbe, conosce anco il singolare dal 
quale detta specie in qualche modo fu cagionata; Cosi non potendo lui in alcun modo, o 
compitamente, o incopitamente intendere senza Disegno, forma anche di quel singolare 
un Disegno interno in se stesso. Si che intendono noi qual si voglia cosa; prima la fantasia, 
e la cognitione dei singolari di quella formano due concetti, uno sensato; e l’altro insensa-
to, poi l’intelletto dirittamente intendono, forma il Disegno interno commune rappresen-
tante quella cosa in generale, quanto alla natura comune, in ultimo indirittamente 
discorrendo, ne forma un’altro Disegno particolare rappresentando i singolari di quella 
natura’. 
27
 Romano Alberti, Origine e Progresso dell’Academia del Disegno (Pavia: Pietro Bartoli, 
1604),  p. 19: ‘Si deve pero sapere che non d’una, ma di due forti, è il disegno, cioè intel-
lettivo, e prattico, poiche si come sono duoi intelletti in noi uno chiamato speculativo, il 
cui fine proprio è l’intendere solamente in universale, e l’altro adimandato intelletto pra-
tico, il cui termine proprio, e ultimo è l’operare, o per dire meglio esser principio 
dell’operationi nostre…’. 
28
 Ibid.: ‘è necessario che anco siano due i disegni alluminanti gl’intelletti nostri, cioè uno 
che è oggetto, e termino dell’intelletto cognoscitivo, e questo rappresenta all’intelletto le 
cose universalmente intese, e l’altro che è oggetto e termino dell’intelletto prattico, e que-
sto rappresenta all’intelletto le cose in particolare, e in singolare’. 
29
 Ibid., p. 18: ‘Il disegno è una apparente espressione e dichiaratione del cocetto, che era 
prima nell’animo…’. 
30
 Ibid., p. 19: ‘che cosa sia il disegno esterno, in forma sua visiva...hora il pratico dico 
essere forma di tutte le forme essemplare di tutte le cose, ch’immaginare, e formare si 
possono…’. 
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31
 Ibid, p. 18 ‘la forma della scienza...che dice il disegno essere una facoltà di terminare 
perfettamente le proportioni di quantità nelle cose visibile…’. 
32
 Ibid.: ‘è insieme un termine della nostra intelligenza, in cui come in lucidissimo spec-
chio l’intelletto chiaramente, e espressamente vede le cose rapresentate in lui, per le for-
me intelligibili ornanti l’istesso intelletto, o ragionando in metafora, e similitudine lo 
difiniremo…’. 
